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I. Introduction
It is fitting that the fortieth anniversary of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) fell
in the same year that an African American, Barack Obama, won the election
for president of the United States. It is fitting because the FHA has always
reflected, like the Congress that created it and the many cities and neigh-
borhoods affected by it, an ambivalence concerning the salience of race as
an issue. Some indicators, such as the success of individuals like Obama,
suggest that race-based economic and legal policies are anachronisms. The
social, economic, and political gains of millions of African Americans over
the last forty years suggest a positive resolution to the Kerner Commis-
sion's fears of a racially separate and unequal society.1 The urban inequali-
ties that continue to exist pale in intensity to the disorder and riots that
augured the passing of the FHA in 1968. Other indicators, however, do not
support such optimism. From a mountaintop view, many of the nation's
cities are identified by white and nonwhite enclaves, areas of affluence and
poverty, and neighborhoods enjoying a renaissance of wealth juxtaposed
with neighborhoods marked by a dizzying number of foreclosed homes,
vacant homes, and struggling homeowners.
The availability of credit, to individual borrowers and to communities,
is an integral factor shaping the geography of housing opportunity. Cities
are shaped by the housing and borrowing choices of their residents and the
attendant mobility--or lack of mobility-of families. When lenders deny
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credit to neighborhoods or borrowers because of race, communities suffer.2
And when lenders flood these same neighborhoods with subprime or preda-
tory loan products, the communities suffer once again.3 The economic gains
of individuals and of communities in cities over the last several decades are
threatened by massive property devaluations, loss of equity, and foreclo-
sures. These losses threaten the ability of families to move to better neigh-
borhoods, the continued sustainability of marginal urban communities, and
the general social and economic health of cities burdened by foreclosures,
declining revenues, and increased demands for local services.
Predatory lending litigation under the FHA attacks this new threat
faced by individuals, communities, and cities. This litigation also deploys
a new weapon: the city as plaintiff.4 Cities taking proactive steps to address
the effects of race and credit on the geography of the city is a promising
evolution. Cities have frequently been the target of fair housing lawsuits
but also the site for locally based community development efforts. The
failures of housing and development policies over the years to effectively
grapple with the urban institutional structures created by decades of ra-
cial segregation and animus are, in part, a political failure.5 But the con-
tinuing difficulty in reconciling the pernicious structural effects of racial
discrimination and segregation with individual and community wealth-
building strategies also reflects the complexity of the problem. The city
as fair-lending plaintiff offers a hope of reconciliation between race and
wealth creation.
One critique of FHA litigation is its relatively limited enforcement. Al-
though courts have construed standing to be "as broad as is permitted by
Article III of the Constitution,"6 a recent Baltimore case is the first preda-
tory lending case to have a city as plaintiff.7 The Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) enforces the FHA.8 Private parties9 and
the Department of Justice (DOJ)10 can also bring FHA claims in court. Simi-
larly, private organizations, such as neighborhood nonprofits employing
fair housing testers, have brought FHA claims. These cases are an impor-
tant part of FHA enforcement, but still rely primarily on recognizing and
responding to irdividual acts of housing discrimination. Public and pri-
vate resources to identify and pursue these acts of discrimination are lim-
ited, and, by many indications, the public enforcement of the FHA is not
as effective as it should be." The city as plaintiff in FHA suits offers an ad-
ditional opportunity to pursue FHA violations, and on a broader scale than
remedying individual acts of discrimination. Although other plaintiffs, like
DOJ and private organizations, may bring suits on behalf of a large group,
the city as plaintiff is in an ideal position to identify the public harms of
predatory lending and address these harms at an effective level.2
II. The FHA's Role in Combating Discriminatory
Lending Practices
The FHA has been used to combat discriminatory lending practices
since its enactment in 1968. Section 3604(a) of the FHA makes it unlawful
"[to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse
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to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny,
a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
or national origin."
13
Section 3604(b) prohibits discrimination "against any person in the
terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the
provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."14
Section 3605 of the FHA makes it unlawful for "any person or other
entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions 5 to discriminate against any person in making available such
a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such a transaction, because of
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin."16
Courts have recognized that both § 3604 and § 3605 apply to discrimi-
nation in the availability of mortgage financing for the purchase of a
home.' 7 Section 3605 clearly applies to a home equity loan or similar refi-
nancing transaction. Courts are sometimes hesitant, however, to construe
the otherwise make unavailable language in § 3604(a) to reach refinancing
transactions. 8 Plaintiffs have a two-year statute of limitations under the
FHA, 19 which can be extended if the plaintiffs demonstrate a continuing
violation.
2
Plaintiffs alleging discrimination in lending often rely on laws besides
the FHA, including the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,2' the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),22 § 1981,73 and § 1982.24 In
addition, state attorneys general have pursued predatory lending claims
under state antifraud laws. California was one of the first states to sue
Countrywide Financial, alleging predatory lending practices in violation of
state law.25 California and a coalition of other states recently settled the suit
against the company for $8.4 billion in direct assistance to affected borrow-
ers, among other terms.
26
III. The Elusive Nature of Predatory and Subprime Lending
The term predatory lending in mortgage markets has dominated the
popular and legal literature in recent years.27 Defining the term has proven
more challenging. One defendant mortgage corporation argued that "the
term 'predatory lending is of little value as a legal term,' and that it is an
amorphous concept which is 'vacuous, with its description the subject of
a semantic shell game.'"m A subsequent study by professors Kathleen C.
Engel and Patricia A. McCoy offers a frequently cited definition of preda-
tory lending:
[P]redatory lending [is] a syndrome of abusive loan terms or practices that
involve one or more of the following five problems: (1) loans structured
to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers, [e.g., loans
that contain unaffordable balloon payments], (2) harmful rent seeking, [e.g.,
prepaid credit life insurance], (3) loans involving fraud or deceptive prac-
tices, (4) other forms of lack of transparency in loans that are not actionable
as fraud, and (5) loans that require borrowers to waive meaningful legal
redress 9
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A precise definition of predatory lending is also elusive because of its
overlap with subprime lending. Subprime lending refers to the practice of ex-
tending credit to borrowers under terms that are less favorable than given
to borrowers with excellent credit histories. Not all subprime loans are
predatory, and many borrowers with less than prime credit have been able
to obtain mortgages to finance housing purchases, one large component of
the American dream. These subprime loans are more expensive than other
loan products, however, and one commentator found that "the great bulk
of subprime loans contain predatory terms."10
The combination of subprime and predatory lending has caused a mas-
sive foreclosure crisis.3' The frequency and amount of this lending has in-
creased dramatically, and, as a result, millions of borrowers are unable to
repay mortgage loans. Predatory lending threatens the twin goals of the
FHA, i.e., integration and nondiscrimination. Integration goals suffer as in-
dividuals lose equity in their homes, depriving them of the financial means
to move out of segregated neighborhoods and into integrated neighbor-
hoods. The nondiscrimination goal is endangered when lenders target ra-
cial minority neighborhoods to sell inferior credit products.
IV. The FHA's Traditional Application to Discriminatory
Lending and Redlining
Before predatory lending, an earlier battleground of the FHA involved
redlining, that is, the practice of denying credit to certain neighborhoods
based on the racial composition of those areas. Redlining can be described
through two lenses, the first focusing on a higher rate of loan denials
in minority neighborhoods compared with nonminority neighborhoods
(a process-based approach), and the second focusing on the smaller amount
of credit extended in minority neighborhoods compared to nonminority
neighborhoods (an outcome-based approach).32
Identifying individual instances of lending discrimination can be dif-
ficult. There are many opportunities in the home buying process to exer-
cise acts of discrimination. A buyer may be impermissibly influenced by a
racially focused real estate ad; a buyer may have multiple encounters with
one or more realtors; and a buyer will have multiple interactions with dif-
ferent actors during the lending process, including banks, appraisers, and
insurers-' Discriminatory conduct could occur in any of these instances or
encounters, and the conduct is often not obvious to a buyer. "The subtlety
of discriminatory practices means ... discrimination is difficult for an indi-
vidual home-seeker to detect."34
Community-based reinvestment strategists fought the lending in-
dustry's resistance to lend in minority neighborhoods in cities across the
country.3 Largely as a result of these campaigns, Congress enacted laws to
provide additional information about how lending decisions, lending out-
comes, and race intertwine. Congress enacted the Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure Act (HMDA) in 1975.36 The HMDA requires banks to report aggregate
loan and application information according to census tract, race, gender,
HeinOnline -- 18 J. Affordable Hous. & Cmty. Dev. L. 172 2008-2009
Predatory Lending and the City as Plaintiff
and income level.37 The HMDA does not, however, capture other charac-
teristics of borrowers that would be helpful in figuring out the true extent
of discrimination. For example, the HMDA does not include information
on borrowers' indebtedness or credit histories, two important measures of
the creditworthiness of borrowers. Congress also enacted the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) in 1977.31 The CRA helps to provide information
about lending patterns in minority areas and rewards lenders for providing
credit in areas traditionally underserved. 39 Although they have their limita-
tions, both laws are important in providing information about credit and
race to housing advocates.
V. The Current Battleground: Applying the FHA
to Cases of Reverse Redlining
In recent years, another battleground, reverse redlining, has emerged.
Reverse redlining is the practice of targeting credit products to minority
neighborhoods under discriminatory and unfavorable terms. In contrast
to traditional redlining concerns of communities starved for credit, minor-
ity communities are flooded with credit products under reverse redlining.
These credit products frequently contain predatory terms and are dis-
proportionately expensive compared to products offered in nonminority
neighborhoods to nonminority borrowers with similar creditworthiness.
The onerous terms of these predatory loan products cause a massive num-
ber of defaults, and ultimately foreclosures, when borrowers can no longer
afford the high payments or penalties that the loans require.
The Pew Foundation estimates that one in thirty-three homeowners
will experience foreclosure, with most of them occurring before 2010.40
Few states are immune from the foreclosure crisis, as illustrated by an
increase of at least 20 percent in mortgage loans entering foreclosure be-
tween 2006 and 2007 in forty-seven states and Washington, D.C.41 At the
same time, some states and some groups of people are especially hard-hit
by the foreclosure crisis. Just seven states account for more than half of
loans that are in foreclosure or seriously delinquent.42 African American
and Latino borrowers are significantly more likely to receive higher-rate
subprime loans than white borrowers with the same income and credit
risk factors.43 The terms of subprime loans place borrowers at a higher risk
of foreclosure.44
The number of subprime loans has increased commensurate with the
increased technological ability of lenders to effectively price loans outside
of the prime borrower market.45 Subprime debt constituted $1.3 trillion in
2007, up from $332 billion in 2003.46 Other factors that contributed to the
growth of subprime lending in the 1990s included inconsistent financial
regulation among banks, thrifts, and mortgage and finance companies;
federal preemption of state usury laws; growth of an elderly population
less familiar with conventional lending products and in need of cash from
refinancing equity in homes; and an increase in credit card debt leading to
pressures to refinance.
47
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Some blame the foreclosure crisis on increased pressure to construct
lower-cost housing in financially creative ways. One argument puts the
blame on laws like the CRA. Under this reasoning, lenders were pressured
to overextend credit to financially unqualified borrowers and communities
under practices that were unsound and unsafe.4 A related view holds that
lenders are unfairly criticized for making defensible (and socially minded)
business decisions. Subprime lending makes credit available to areas tradi-
tionally underserved by the credit market and to borrowers with less than
prime credit scores. Lenders are being sued for making this credit avail-
able in the first instance and for making it available at a price that, lenders
argue, compensates the industry for its higher risk of default in these geo-
graphic areas or among these borrowers. 9
A precise measure of the relative contributions of government policies,
borrower decisions, and lending practices toward the current foreclosure
crisis may be impossible to establish. In FHA suits, plaintiffs target the
lenders' share of responsibility for the crisis. In order to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination based on reverse redlining, a plaintiff "must
show that the defendants' lending practices and loan terms were 'unfair'
and 'predatory,' and that the defendants either intentionally targeted on
the basis of race, or that there is a disparate impact on the basis of race. " '
A plaintiff can therefore establish a prima facie case by arguing either dispa-
rate impact or intentional targeting.5 If there is evidence that a lender made
loans to white and nonwhite borrowers on different terms, then plaintiffs
may be successful arguing disparate impact. If, on the other hand, lenders
make loans only in nonwhite communities to nonwhite borrowers, then a
disparate impact argument will not be available and plaintiffs can attempt
to demonstrate that lenders intentionally targeted the nonwhite area.-2
Racially segregated communities facilitate targeting. In one Chicago
case, lenders targeted a 95 percent African American community for credit
with predatory terms.-" The loan products offered in targeted communi-
ties were less favorable than in other communities. Plaintiffs alleged that
Capital City Mortgage Company targeted African Americans in the Wash-
ington, D.C., area with less favorable loans than those for similarly situated
white borrowers.- The targeting of African American borrowers may occur
through advertisements on gospel radio stations,5 lending offices inten-
tionally placed within African American communities,-6 and expressions of
trust and solidarity with African American leaders."
Another illustration of predatory lending is the practice of high-yield
spread premiums, or "the difference between the interest rate the lender
would accept for the loan and the interest rate that the borrower is actu-
ally charged." Lenders target unsophisticated borrowers (and in FHA
claims, minority borrowers) to get them to agree to higher interest rates.
The practice is objectionable for "setting rates based on the perceived fi-
nancial sophistication of the borrower rather than the risk of extending the
loan." 9 This practice is fostered by the separation between the underlying
mortgage lender and the person or entity selling the loan to the consumer
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face-to-face. Plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide's policy of allowing point-
of-sale lenders, brokers, and agents to subjectively mark up the pricing of
loan products above the company's objective, risk-based criteria forced Af-
rican Americans to borrow at a higher rate than white borrowers. 60 Simi-
larly, a plaintiff in Chicago alleged that minority borrowers received less
favorable loans than nonminority borrowers through high-yield spread
premiums.61
Refinancing also presents an especially dangerous predatory lending
opportunity, particularly when employed against elderly borrowers. Re-
finance and home equity lending make up the bulk of the growth of sub-
prime loans.62 Elderly borrowers are likely to have substantial equity in
their homes, and predatory lenders target this group for high-priced loans
to fund home repairs or to consolidate debt.63 These loans contain terms,
like prepayment penalties or exorbitant interest rates, that borrowers find
impossible to repay. The added tragedy of these home equity loans is that
they affect those homeowners who own their houses free and clear or who
have accumulated substantial equity. These borrowers lose their homes
and the wealth that they accumulated over the years. Refinancing is clearly
covered by § 3605 and may also be covered by § 3604. 64
In another attempt to combat predatory lending practices, the NAACP
sued a number of lending institutions citing violations of the FHA, the
ECOA, § 1981, and § 1982. The NAACP alleged that lenders sold "sub-
prime residential mortgages to African Americans who qualify for prime
residential mortgages at grossly unfavorable terms compared to Cauca-
sians who continue to receive better terms than their African American
counterparts." 65 The NAACP also claimed that a number of facially neutral
lending policies create an adverse disparate impact on African Americans
in violation of the FHA, including
A. actively marketing subprime residential loan products directly to
consumers, without providing applicants with sufficient information
on how to purchase prime residential mortgage products from [the
lender];
B. providing financial incentives for mortgage brokers to steer consum-
ers to subprime residential mortgage products in lieu of prime resi-
dential mortgage products from [the lender];
C. not providing meaningful review of loan applications to determine
whether the applicant qualifies for a prime residential mortgage prod-
uct offered by [the lender].66
Additionally, the NAACP alleged that lenders disproportionately mar-
keted teaser-rate loans to African American communities and evaluated
these borrowers' ability to pay the loans based only on the introductory
teaser rate and not the adjusted higher rate that kicked in later.67 Some argue
that the magnitude of these teaser rates has been exaggerated. As one com-
mentator noted, "An urban legend is that subprime hybrid ARMs came
with low teaser rates.... [S]ubprime hybrid ARMs always came with sub-
stantial starter rates-often little different from subprime thirty-year fixed
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rates."6 Banks and borrowers understood that these loans were meant to
be refinanced, and they would have been if housing prices had continued
to climb.69 On the other hand, even if interest rates between ARMs and
subprime thirty-year fixed-rate loans were similar, these subprime loans
carried substantial up-front and prepayment fees that eroded buyer equity
and increased the loans' attractiveness to mortgage lenders and brokers
who could collect those fees.70
VI. The Next Phase? The City as Plaintiff
Cities, because of their size and influence on the lives of residents, are
frequently the location of fair housing and economic development activity
and offer a new way to approach these claims: the city as plaintiff.
America's metropolitan areas have endured hard economic and so-
cial shifts. Suburban outmigration has depleted inner cities of relatively
wealthier, and whiter, residents. Deindustrialization and globalization
have altered the employment landscape for traditional manufacturing cit-
ies, thrusting many urban residents out of jobs and shuttering industries
that once contributed heavily to economic and social interests. Federal
government policies have exacerbated these same trends through a home
mortgage income tax deduction that has facilitated suburban outmigration,
mortgage insurance programs, highway transportation funding, public
housing, and other programs that have facilitated the economic and racial
segregation of cities.71 Cities have often been the targets of criticism and
judicial sanction for responding to these challenges by isolating minority
communities through land use policies and selective economic develop-
ment programs. It is significant that cities are now on the offensive in hold-
ing private actors accountable for predatory lending and its harmful effect
on minority communities.
The city as fair-lending plaintiff offers an opportunity to effectively dis-
mantle the structures of racial segregation that continue to affect individual
borrowers and neighborhood characteristics. Cities are at the appropriate
geographic level to meaningfully affect wealth distribution through access
to credit and housing, as well as the racial structures that impede this ac-
cess. Cities are increasingly participating as independent, influential actors
in a wide variety of policy and legal arenas such as immigration 72 and eco-
nomic development.73 This increased participation and influence reflects
cities' importance as economic engines, social centers, and political actors.
Moreover, cities are geographically and psychologically aligned with their
residents. Individuals and neighborhood representatives actively partici-
pate in city decisions perceived to have a direct impact on their lives. Indi-
viduals are defined by their city neighborhood. In turn, these communities
of individuals define cities. One cannot think of New York, San Francisco,
or Chicago without thinking about distinct neighborhoods, such as SoHo,
Chinatown, or Hyde Park.
Baltimore's suit against Wells Fargo marks the first time that a city has
been a plaintiff in an FHA predatory lending suit. Cities satisfy the FHA's
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liberal standing requirements because they qualify as "aggrieved person[s]"
injured by a discriminatory housing practice 4 Cities sue not in a repre-
sentative capacity but instead for harms that the city suffers. Cities have
been plaintiffs, however, in other types of FHA litigation besides predatory
lending. In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, the village of Bellwood
(a suburb of Chicago) claimed that realtors steered African American home
buyers toward a target area of the city and white home buyers away from
that area in violation of the FHA.75 The City of Chicago brought a similar
steering claim against realtors,76 as did Cleveland Heights, Ohio77 Cities
also have the option to bring predatory lending suits under doctrines other
than the FHA. Cleveland sued Deutsche Bank and other financial institu-
tions under the theory of public nuisance.78 Buffalo recently brought suit
against a lender under nuisance law and city code provisions. 9
Cities sue under the FHA alleging harms to the municipality itself. Cal-
culating the harm to cities begins with tracking the massive number of fore-
closures in minority neighborhoods caused by predatory lending. As noted
earlier, redlining starved some urban communities of credit and deprived
residents within those communities of experience and sophistication about
mortgage products and terms ° One can draw a straight line from redlin-
ing to the phenomenon of reverse redlining. When the subprime spigots
open, these residents become the prime targets for expensive lending prod-
ucts. Cities with segregated housing markets allow lenders to more eas-
ily target minority borrowers in minority communities for these subprime
products.81
Lenders specialize in making loans to different neighborhoods within a
segregated housing market. For example, eighteen of the top twenty refi-
nance lenders in white neighborhoods in 1998 Chicago were prime lenders
compared to eighteen of the top twenty refinance lenders in black neighbor-
hoods that were classified as subprime lenders. 2 Concentrated subprime
lending within targeted communities leads to geographically concentrated
foreclosures.8u
These foreclosures increase the number of vacant homes. In a city like
Baltimore, where there are already a significant number of vacant homes,
these new vacancies are particularly troublesome.84 Vacant houses harm
neighborhoods by reducing the values of nearby homes. In addition to
being unsightly, vacant homes attract vandalism and crime. Similarly, slip-
shod attempts to repair vacant or distressed houses and resell these homes
to unwitting purchasers is actionable under the FHA.8
At the same time, city property tax receipts fall as property values de-
cline. Cities must expend additional money to cope with an increase in
foreclosures and an increase in vacant housing. Cities must pay "for ser-
vices related to foreclosures, including the costs of securing vacant homes,
holding administrative hearings, and conducting other administrative
and legal procedures."86 Cities also have to devote additional resources
to fire and police protection.8 7 Empirical studies have calculated declines
in property values and increases in municipal expenditures as a result of
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foreclosure. Dan Immergluck and Geoff Smith found that foreclosures have
reduced nearby property values by an average of $159,000 per foreclosure
in Chicago.8 In another study of Chicago, William Apgar found that each
foreclosure could cost municipalities $34,000 in increased expenditures and
nearby property values could decline as much as $220,000.9 These quantifi-
able damages to cities, along with punitive damages, are available under
the FHA.90
Litigation is not the only opportunity for cities to combat predatory
lending, but legislative responses have not been enthusiastically received.
For example, city ordinances combating predatory lending have often been
struck down under the argument that state or federal laws preempt their
enforcement.91 Until local legislative responses are more effective, litigation
continues to offer the best means for cities to confront the problems posed
by predatory lending.
VII. Conclusion
The National Fair Housing Alliance, a consortium of private, nonprofit
fair housing organizations, state and local civil rights organizations, and
individuals observed the fortieth anniversary of the FHA with events
throughout 2008. In the fortieth Anniversary Commemorative Statement,
the organization wrote, "Today, we commemorate the fortieth anniversary
of the Fair Housing Act. We commemorate, not celebrate, because we are
still so far from achieving the balanced and integrated living patterns envi-
sioned by the original Act's authors. "92
This is the sobering truth of housing opportunity today. Although the
country has made significant strides in race relations and wealth creation,
much remains to be done. The recent subprime and predatory lending crisis
threatens to undo many of the tenuous economic gains of minority individ-
uals and the communities in which they live. The FHA can be a powerful
weapon against predatory lending, particularly with a city as plaintiff, if it
is employed broadly and boldly.
Cities, as "aggrieved persons" under the FHA, have the potential to be
powerful advocates for fair housing goals. They are geographically and
cognitively appropriate sites for identifying lending discrimination and
for effectively deploying remedies. Cities, as local service providers, are
close to the needs of their residents and often expected to be the primary
responders to public health and economic development concerns. Cities
as plaintiffs give cities the resources they need to respond to this new eco-
nomic threat.
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